Iran And Southeast Asia: An Analysis Of Iran's

Policy Of "Look To The East" by Soltaninejad, Mohammad
IJAPS, Vol. 13, No. 1, 29–49, 2017  
 
 
© Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2017 
IRAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S 
POLICY OF "LOOK TO THE EAST" 
 
Mohammad Soltaninejad
*
 
Faculty of World Studies, North Campus, University of Tehran,  
North Kargar Ave, 14155-6468 Tehran, Iran 
email: Soltaninejad@ut.ac.ir 
 
Published online: 15 January 2017 
 
To cite this article: Soltaninejad, M. 2017. Iran and Southeast Asia: An analysis of 
Iran's policy of "Look to the East." International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 
13 (1): 29–49, http://dx.doi.org/10.21315/ijaps2017.13.1.2       
 
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.21315/ijaps2017.13.1.2      
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article studies the sudden rise in the economic and commercial relations 
between Iran and Southeast Asian countries from 2007 to 2011 and its collapse 
afterwards. The author attributes this phenomenon to two factors: first, politics' 
priority over economy in Iran's foreign policy during the years Iran adopted the 
policy of "Look to the East," and second, characteristics of Iran's relations with 
the great powers of the United States and China. Based on these, the author 
contends that Iran's bid to establish firm economic relations with the East in 
order to manage and reduce political pressures from the West is the reason for 
sudden rise in Iran-Southeast Asia relations. The rising trend in the relations was 
reversed from 2011 onward mainly due to the United States' persuasion of the 
Southeast Asian countries to reduce cooperation with Iran. The author further 
discusses that the dynamics of Iran-China relations have also limited the scope of 
Iran-Southeast Asia cooperation. 
 
Keywords: Southeast Asia, the policy of Look to the East, Iran's foreign relations, 
the United States, China 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The subject of Iran-Southeast Asian countries'
1
 relations has remained 
extensively unattended in study of Iran's foreign policy. In the midst of this 
scholarly silence, Iran has developed broad diplomatic, trade, economic and 
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technological relations with the Southeast Asian nations either bilaterally or 
through multilateral settings. A quick review of the relations between Iran 
and the countries of Southeast Asia during a twelve year time span (2002–
2013) is indicative of a peculiar phenomenon: sudden rise in amount and 
value of commercial and economic relations from 2007 to 2011 and a 
subsequent sharp decline afterwards. Studying the conditions under them 
Iran has embarked on expansion of relations with countries of Southeast 
Asia, I contend that the flow and ebb in Iran's relations with Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippines has taken place not as a 
result of the necessities or characteristics of such relations but rather due to 
the quality of Iran's relations with the great powers of the United States and 
China. In other words, changes in Iran-Southeast Asia relations have been 
reflective of the shifts in Iran's relations with the great powers.
2
 
Based on this, in the present study, I hypothesise that "Iran's bid to 
establish firm economic relations with the East in order to reduce political 
pressures from the West is the reason for the sudden rise in Iran-Southeast 
Asia relations and its non-durability is a result of dynamics of Iran's 
relations with the great powers of the United States and China." In order to 
test this hypothesis, first I explain the different phases of Iran's foreign 
policy and locate the policy of "Look to the East" within these phases. Then 
I review the history of Iran's relations with Southeast Asia and study the 
impact of the policy of Look to the East on Iran's relations with the 
countries of Southeast Asia. At the end, an analysis on the role the great 
powers of the United States and China have played in determining the scope 
and direction of these relations will be presented. 
 
 
LOCATING "LOOK TO THE EAST" IN IRANIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
 
Ever since the 1979 revolution and as a result of shifts in governments, 
different and competing discourses have dominated Iranian politics, each 
with certain and significant consequences for the direction of foreign policy. 
During the first three years after collapse of the Shah's regime and 
establishment of the new political system, a realist discourse of self- 
preservation dominated Iranian politics. The interim government of Mehdi 
Bazargan, the first post-revolution prime minister, was mandated with 
establishment of new institutions and securing longevity of the newly 
founded political system. Among the foreign policy principles of the interim 
government were inclination towards the West and insistence on 
nonintervention in other countries internal affairs (Bakhshayesh Ardestani 
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2000: 83). The early statesmen of the Islamic Republic within Bazargan's 
cabinet were of the belief that preserving and stabilising the Islamic 
Republic is bound to sustaining ties with the western powers, particularly 
the United States. As a result, Bazargan tried to boost relations with 
America and arranged meetings with American officials including Zbigniew 
Brzezinski the then national security advisor to Jimmy Carter (Rezaee 2009: 
268). 
With taking over of the United States' embassy in Tehran in 1979 and 
the subsequent resignation of the interim government, the idealist 
revolutionary discourse prevailed over Iranian foreign policy centred on the 
notion of "export of revolution." According to this discourse, the Islamic 
revolution was not confined to the boundaries of Iran and belonged to the 
Muslims around the world and therefore exporting the revolution was 
considered a duty to be fulfilled (Yazdani and Akhjasteh 2012: 62). As 
Ramezani argues: "Exporting revolution was a means to defend the Islamic 
Republic in the short run and establishment of a new world order under the 
umbrella of Islamic justice in long terms" (Ramezani 2009: 65). This was a 
clear departure from the realist approach to foreign policy towards an 
idealist and revisionist one that criticised international power relations and 
international organisations. This idealism that prioritised relations with the 
oppressed people around the world over cooperation with governments 
lasted up until the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. At the centre of this 
policy was opposition to the arrogant superpowers with the slogan of "No 
East, No West." However, despite expectations to be equidistant from both 
eastern and western powers, Iran was more "No West" than "No East" 
during these years. 
The end of the Iran-Iraq war that coincided with presidency of Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani put an end to this revisionist foreign policy and brought 
to the fore a pragmatist and economy-first agenda. The ruins of the war had 
to be repaired, the economy had to be driven out of stagnation and the 
government debts had to be settled. These economic necessities together 
with changes in the international system with collapse of the Soviet Union 
gave room for a foreign policy directed towards reducing tensions with the 
international community particularly the western countries and adoption of a 
policy based on détente (Tajik and Dehghani Firoozabadi 2003: 70). As a 
result, repairing relations with the governments replaced expansion of ties 
with non-governmental and oppositionist movements around the world and 
Iran tried to restore constructive relations with the western countries in order 
to absorb modern technology and foreign investments. The height of this 
policy was during the presidency of the reformist Seyyed Mohammad 
Khatami who proposed the idea of "Dialogue among Civilisations" and 
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pursued a constructive engagement with European countries in the course of 
resolving Iran's nuclear issue (Soori 2005: 186–191). 
The cyclical pattern of rapprochement with the West followed by 
disengagements from it continued after Rafsanjani and Khatami, this time 
by revival of the revolutionary and idealist discourse during Ahmadinejad's 
terms in office (2005–2013). This new era in Iranian foreign policy that is 
best known as Look to the East saw an unprecedented push for revitalisation 
of relations with the eastern countries in parallel with intensification of 
tensions with the West. Although in the past Iran had approached the eastern 
centres of power in times of escalating tensions with the West, this time 
around it tried to mend fences with the East for it to act as a balancing force 
against the West. In fact, policy of Look to the East was supposed to grant 
the country a wider margin of manoeuvre during confrontation with the 
West over the nuclear issue. The new approach utilised economy to serve 
political and diplomatic objectives and sought to reduce Iran's dependence 
to the countries that were not politically cooperative (Saqafi Ameri 2006: 
27–28). So unlike the previous cases of antagonism with the West that were 
informed by the revolutionary slogan of "no East-no West" this time Iran 
tried to mitigate western hostility by recourse to the East. 
Although this policy was never manifested in any official document 
or even discussed formally, its founding logic was quite clear: Iran needed 
to boost its diplomatic and economic relations with the eastern countries to 
gain leverage against the West's mounting pressures. Despite the fact that 
the idea of expanding relations with the eastern partners was never new in 
Iranian foreign policy setting, the policy of Look to the East was unique this 
time around. What distinguished the new Iranian approach from the 
historical pattern was that Iran wanted to mend fences with the East, this 
time without reducing tensions with the West. In stark contrast to the 
foreign policy of the reformist administration of Khatami which sought 
détente with the West and characterised itself with the idea of "Dialogue 
among Civilisations," the Look to the East policy of the conservative 
administration of Ahmadinejad was after tightening the links with the East 
in order to relieve itself from détente with the West (Akbarzadeh 2014: 97). 
In fact, the policy of Look to the East wanted economy as a tool to advance 
political objectives (Shafiei and Sadeghi 2010: 311).  
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IRAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
RELATIONS 
 
The history of Iran's relations with the Southeast Asian nations dates back to 
the pre-Islamic era and the time trade connected west of Asia to the east of 
this continent. The archipelago was located in the middle of the trade route 
from Iran to China and therefore trade with the Chinese merchants kept 
Iranians connected to the residents of Southeast Asia. It is quite well-known 
that, for centuries, products called "Persian" including fumigants, perfumed 
woods, gums and resins have been exported from west Asia to China. Such 
products were delivered through Southeast Asia (Brown 2003: 14). With the 
bloom of trade in Southeast Asia during the seventh century, the ports of 
this region were expanded unprecedentedly and occupied special places in 
the international trade of the time. During this era, Iran remained one of the 
main starting points and also destinations for trade with Southeast Asia. 
During this time, the Maluku spices were sold in Iran and the Iranian resin 
and cotton cloth found a profitable market in Southeast Asia. The flourish in 
trade led to residence of an Iranian population in the archipelago and other 
parts of Southeast Asia. For instance, the well-known city-state of Srivijaya 
which used to be one of the greatest centres of power and wealth from 8th to 
12th century was host to, among other nationals, a considerable number of 
Iranians (Brown 2003: 20). With introduction of Islam to Southeast Asia 
and emergence of the Muslim resident port-states, particularly from the 16th 
century onwards, the number of Iranians in the archipelago increased and 
they dispersed more broadly throughout the region. 
The zenith of Iran's engagement in Southeast Asia was during the 
Safavid Empire (1501–1736). The years this empire ruled Iran coincide with 
the elementary phases of modern nation-states in Europe. Safavids are 
normally known as harbinger of Iranian modern state in the aftermath of the 
post-Islamic caliphs and subsequent Turko-Iranian dynasties. During the 
reign of the Safavid Kings, particularly Shah Abbas the Great, Iranian 
borders were defined and a unified stratum of Islam, that is Shia, was 
introduced to the whole nation. With respect to foreign relations, the 
Safavids established trade-based relations with their counterparts around the 
world and export of commodities became the major source of state's 
revenue. Customs were first recognised in this period and foreign economic 
interactions were regulated in a quite functional way. Such developments 
were consequential for expansion of ties between Iran and Southeast Asia. 
There were two conduits for Iran's trade and cultural relations with 
Southeast Asia from this time onward: First, the sea routes that connected 
Persian Gulf to the Southern China Sea and passed through the Southeast 
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Asian straits and waterways; and second, the land route from Iran to South 
Indian ports and thereafter to Southeast Asia. Here, the Qutb Shahi Dynasty 
(1512–1687) in southern India was a major contributor. The Qutb Shahi 
kings were Twelve-Imam Shia believers who enjoyed close relations with 
the Iranian Safavids and were regarded as the centre of Shiism in the Indian 
subcontinent. Since the northern parts of the subcontinent were ruled by the 
Sunni Mughal Empire, the Qutb Shahis attracted the Shia all over the 
subcontinent and provided them with protection. They were at the same 
time regarded as a major link between Iran and the South Indian waters and 
thereafter Southeast Asian lands (Marcinkowski 2014: 4). Collapse of the 
Qutb Shahis by the Mughal Empire (1687) even intensified spread of 
Iranians in Southeast Asia by pushing those residing in southern India to 
move further south and southeast. This was particularly a contributor to 
increase in number of Iranians residing in Siam (Thailand) in a way that 
Shias (Iranians) constituted the majority of Siamese Muslims. Some of them 
even occupied significant posts particularly in foreign trade affairs of this 
country (Marcinkowski 2014: 5). 
This historical pattern of economic and cultural relations continued to 
exist after the Iranian revolution of 1979. Although at the beginning, the 
Iranian vision of promoting revolutionary values overshadowed Iran's 
relations with countries of Southeast Asia, over time the economic logic 
retained its traditional position in determining the direction of relations. The 
Iranian revolution occurred in a time of religious movements revival in the 
Muslim majority countries of Southeast Asia, most notably Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and therefore served as a source of inspiration for the emerging 
Islamism in these countries. In Indonesia for instance, Iran's revolution 
raised concerns within Suharto government "about the prospect of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) influencing developments in Indonesia, 
especially Indonesia's student population" (Porter 2002: 71). In Malaysia, 
too, the Islamic movements expressed support to "the spirit of the 
Revolution and Iranian aspirations to establish Islamic justice" (Nair 1997: 
74). In spite of these, two factors diluted the impact the Iranian revolution 
could have left on the Southeast Asian developments and helped trade 
resume its status as the primary defining element of Iran's relations with the 
countries of this region: First, the ability of the regional states to curb the 
Islamist movements during the immediate years after the Iranian revolution; 
second, the widespread Saudi Arabian investment in proliferation of the 
Salafi ideas throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and 
Malaysia (Abuza 2007: 18). 
That said it should also be taken into account that the status of 
Southeast Asian countries in the trade and economic priorities of Iran has 
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not always been stable ever since. Iranian efforts to mend relations with the 
Southeast Asian countries started with the presidency of Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, the most pragmatist figure among the Iranian political elites. 
The first result of Iranian diplomatic initiatives was the visit paid by 
Mahathir Mohamad the then Prime Minister of Malaysia to Iran in April 
1994. During his visit, the Malaysian Prime Minister signed a number of 
protocols and treaties with Iran, all centred on expansion of economic and 
commercial relations between the two countries (Research Center of the 
Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines 1994: 5). The visit 
was paid back by the Iranian president six months later in October 1994. 
During such exchange of visits, foundations for a new phase in the two 
countries relations were laid. According to the signed contracts, the 
Malaysian Petronas acquired 30 percent of the stakes of oil extraction from 
Iranian Sirri oil field. Extraction of 40,000 barrel-per-day from Balal oil 
field was also granted to this leading Malaysian company. The expansion in 
relations which was motored by the similarity of the viewpoints between 
Iranian president and Malaysian Prime Minister, led even to some political 
backing from Malaysia to Iran when the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 
was passed by the U.S. congress in 1996. The rise to power of Iranian 
reformist figure, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, helped even more flourish of 
Iran-Malaysia relations (Hunter 2010: 136). 
Like Malaysia, a new era in Iran-Indonesia relations was ushered by 
ascendance of Iranian Rafsanjani to power. The start of pragmatism in Iran 
and subduing of revolutionary sentiments was accompanied by the 
beginning of the industrialised expansion in Indonesia which necessitated 
search for new consumer markets and energy resources. All these paved the 
way for new developments in relations. As a sign of improvement in 
relations, the Indonesian president, Suharto paid a visit to Tehran in 1994, 
which was the first visit of an Indonesian president to Iran since the Iranian 
revolution. During the next year's visit of Iranian president to Indonesia, a 
joint commission for economic and commercial cooperation between the 
two countries was established. In the meantime, creation of the D-8 
organisation with membership of Iran and Indonesia provided a new venue 
for cooperation between the two countries. During the presidency of Seyyed 
Mohammad Khatami, the Indonesian president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
visited Tehran to take part in the D-8 summit. However no major change 
happened in the bilateral relation until the end of Khatami's tenure (Hunter 
2010: 138). 
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SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER THE POLICY OF LOOK TO THE 
EAST 
 
As seen above, the pragmatist government of Rafsanjani and the reformist 
tide in Iran headed by Seyyed Mohammad Khatami had tried to bring 
economy and trade to the fore in setting Iran's relations with the Southeast 
Asian countries in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. The trend of 
expansion in relations, however, faced a turning point with the coming of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power in 2005. What Ahmadinejad brought 
about was unprecedented expansion of commercial and economic ties with 
countries of Southeast Asia, albeit with a political mandate. Informed by the 
policy of Look to the East, Ahmadinejad tried to boost economic relations 
with the East to counter the political pressures from the West. This policy 
was successfully pursued during the first few years of his tenure but started 
to fail to reach its objectives as the ex-president approached the end of his 
presidency. In fact Ahmadinejad managed to expand ties with Southeast 
Asia in an unprecedented way but could not sustain it towards the end of his 
terms. 
The sudden rise in the Iranian cooperation with the countries of 
Southeast Asia followed by a sharp decline can be understood by reviewing 
the value of bilateral economic and commercial interactions in a 12 years 
period (2002 to 2013). Although the increase in Iranian trade with the 
Southeast Asian countries has been different from one country to the other 
in terms of the longevity, such sudden rise is observable for almost all of the 
countries concerned. With respect to Malaysia as one of the most important 
partners of Iran in the region, study of the bilateral relations from 2002 to 
2013 indicates that from 2005 to 2006 the amount of Iranian exports has 
increased slightly and has reached USD 31 million from the initial figure of 
USD 27 million. This number jumps to USD 178 million in 2007. This 
rising trend however does not sustain and starts to fall from 2007 onwards 
and reaches the very low figure of USD 53 million in 2010. The imports 
from Malaysia show a similar pattern. Iran's import from Malaysia rises to 
USD 420 million in 2006 and starts to decrease afterwards until reaching 
USD 235 million in 2010. Table 1 demonstrates the detailed data of Iran-
Malaysia trade from 2002 to 2013.
3
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Table 1: The data of trade between Iran and Malaysia from 2002 to 2013 (in USD). 
 
Imports Exports Year Imports Exports Year 
453,443,408 186,365,736 2008 195,357,768 8,432,763 2002 
465,996,973 97,325,509 2009 269,902,716 8,910,731 2003 
690,052,930 100,470,108 2010 298,880,072 18,504,773 2004 
583,146,294 132,560,609 2011 328,448,971 27,068,865 2005 
527,067,762 73,935,257 2012 368,221,792 36,265,923 2006 
329,953,984 70,507,654 2013 421,736,524 31,473,060 2007 
 
Source: Website of the Iranian Customs 
 
Study of Iran's trade with Indonesia is also indicative of a similar 
fluctuation. While the amount of exports to Indonesia was never more than 
USD 90 million before 2007, in this year, the figure mounts to USD 205 
million. The increasing trend sustains with a mild slope until 2009 when it 
skyrockets to USD 6 billion. The Iranian imports from Indonesia 
experiences similar up and down. In 2007 the Iranian imports from 
Indonesia reached USD 267 million with a USD 96 million increase 
compared with the previous year. This figure jumps suddenly to more than 
USD 2 million in 2010. However, like what observed about exports, imports 
from Indonesia starts to decline steadily from 2010 till 2013 when it reaches 
to USD 97 million. This is even less than the amount of imports taken place 
in the first year of study. Table 2 demonstrates the detailed data of trade 
between Iran and Indonesia from 2002 to 2013. 
 
Table 2: Data of Iran-Indonesia trade from 2002 to 2013 (in USD). 
 
Imports Exports Year Imports Exports Year 
295,263,162 321,224,000 2008 102,732,760 58,029,952 2002 
265,111,551 368,114,444 2009 128,153,415 68,116,520 2003 
2,174,995,801 6,100,102,340 2010 188,222,798 68,952,295 2004 
188,494,912 1,125,597,098 2011 143,652,813 90,878,786 2005 
148,626,757 400,038,799 2012 171,972,321 63,259,726 2006 
97,040,387 59,489,904 2013 267,666,501 205,798,443 2007 
 
Source: Website of the Iranian Customs 
 
The trade between Iran and Thailand has also experienced a temporary rise 
and has returned to the previous status. Iran's exports to Thailand reaches 
from USD 7 million in 2003 to USD 115 million in 2008. From this year, 
the exports decline and reach USD 45 million in 2013. Iran's import from 
Thailand, however, does not follow the described fluctuation about Iran's 
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import from Malaysia and Indonesia and instead, remains almost even. 
When it comes to Singapore, the trade between Iran and this country 
undergoes considerable ups and downs. The value of Iranian export to 
Singapore in 2002 is only USD 65 million. This figure, however, mounts to 
more than USD 1 billion in 2011. The same happens about the import. Iran's 
import from Singapore reaches to more than USD 1 billion in 2009 from the 
initial USD 443 million in 2003. Such trend continues for four years and 
then faces a sharp decline to USD 680 million. Iranian export to Philippines 
is also illustrative of a sudden rise in exports to USD 2 billion in 2008. After 
that the value of exports experiences a constant slope downwards to USD 
234 million in 2010 and USD 96 million in 2012. 
 
 
RISE IN IRAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS: ECONOMY 
SERVES POLITICS 
 
As seen above, a phenomenon of sudden rise in Iran-Southeast Asian 
relations and a subsequent sharp decline is observable during recent years. 
To explain this phenomenon I recall the discussion about Iranian foreign 
policy orientations, shifts in such orientations and their impact on the weight 
Iran puts on its international partners. As explained earlier, since the 1979 
revolution, Iran's approaches to the global centres of power have changed in 
accordance with the discursive cycles in its foreign policy. During the 
period under study in the present research (2002 to 2013) two distinct views 
have dominated Iranian foreign policy. From end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988 
until the rise of Ahmadinejad to power in 2005, Iran pursued an interactive 
policy vis-à-vis the western powers; particularly the Europeans. The policy 
of détente with the West was followed by both Rafsanjani and Khatami, 
albeit with varying degrees. The ascendance of the conservative discourse to 
the hegemonic position in Iran's foreign policy from 2005 onwards led to a 
shift in Iranian foreign policy from détente with the West to the policy of 
Look to the East. Adopting such a turn, Iran strived to strengthen its 
relations with the eastern powers in a way that guarantees their support in 
the course of confrontation with the West. In other words, Iran sought to 
win the support of the East for it to act as a counterbalance against the West 
and grant Iran a leverage against the Western pressures applied to oblige it 
change its nuclear policy. 
In the framework of the Look to the East policy, Iran tried to find a 
new place among the Southeast Asian countries that had reasons to be 
interested in the Middle East, first to meet their energy needs and second to 
find markets for their manufactured products (Kemp 2010: 6–15). In 
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addition to export of energy, Iran enhanced trade in non-oil products with 
Southeast Asian countries. According to the statistics released by the Iranian 
Trade Promotion Organization, the amount of Iranian exports to the 
members of ASEAN increased 31 percent from 2009 to 2010 (Deutsch-
Iranische Industrie- und Handelskammer 2010). Iran's export to ASEAN 
during the first month of 2010 saw a 72 percent increase compared with the 
same period in 2009 (Moj News 2010). In the same way, the value of Iran's 
non-oil exports to ASEAN rose 90 percent in the first three months of 2011 
compared with the same period in 2010 (Ecasb 2011). By such expansion of 
economic cooperation, Iran tried to deepen its footholds in Southeast Asia to 
rely on the countries of this region as alternatives to its rapidly growing 
unreliable European partners. 
Iran's signing of an agreement to build a new refinery in Indonesia 
with a value of USD 6 million in 2010 was an apparent measure to serve the 
said purpose. The refinery was meant to supply 14 percent of Indonesia's oil 
needs. Iran also started to play a greater role in supply of the Malaysian oil. 
Petronas purchased 600,000 barrels of oil from Iran on a three-month basis 
in 2012. In April 2009, the Iranian National Oil Refining and Distribution 
Company agreed with the Malaysian SKSD over establishment of two 
refineries in Malaysia. In the same year, the joint investment and trade 
between Iran and Malaysia in the field of oil reached USD 22 billion. 
Iranian relations with Singapore and Thailand also enhanced in a similar 
way. Iran-Singapore trade relations exceeded USD 2 billion and Singapore 
imported 20,000 barrels-per-day of Iranian oil. Iran's trade with Thailand 
also grew considerably through export of steel, iron, chemical products and 
medicine in exchange for absorbing the Thai investments in Iranian fishing 
industry. Iran also managed to remain among the Philippines' Middle 
Eastern partners, in spite of their relatively low value of trade. In 2005, Iran 
proposed an investment of more than USD 125 million in expansion of 
Philippine's petrochemical industry. The Export Development Bank of Iran 
and the Vietnam's VietinBank agreed on construction of a 49 Megawatt 
power plant (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2012).   
Iran's efforts to strengthen economic and trade ties with the East in 
time of increasing tensions with the West over the nuclear issue bore 
positive political outcomes at first. The first sign of success in expansion of 
relations with Southeast Asia was Indonesia's defiance to support the United 
States initiatives to send the Iranian nuclear dossier to the United Nations 
Security Council in 2006. The Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, called the Iranian nuclear program peaceful during a press 
conference in 2007 and called into question the legality of the Security 
Council's issuance of a resolution against Iran (Biersteker and Moret 2015: 
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66) One year later Indonesia proved once again the importance of Iran in its 
foreign policy calculations and refrained from cooperating with the United 
States in pressuring Iran. Stressing that it is not convinced about the efficacy 
of sanctions with respect to Iran when Tehran is cooperating with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Jakarta abstained from voting 
to the 1803 United Nations Security Council resolution (IranTracker 2010a). 
Malaysia also issued a statement in July 2008 and welcomed Iran's 
cooperation with the IAEA. At the same time Malaysia declared that Iran's 
decision to use peaceful nuclear energy and its policy of completing the fuel 
cycle should be respected by all members of the international community. 
Such Malaysian stances were demonstrated in practice within international 
organisations. The most notable measure Malaysia took to support Iran was 
its negative vote to November 2009 IAEA resolution against Iran 
(IranTracker 2010b). 
 
 
LIMITS TO IRAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS: THE ROLE 
OF UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
 
The positive signs of cooperation with the East during rising tensions with 
the West were not sustained. A close inspection of Southeast Asian 
countries relations with the United States demonstrates the reasons behind 
failure of Iran's efforts to keep their support against the United States. From 
1950s onwards, the United States-Southeast Asia relations have been 
defined in accordance with security considerations. The straits and water 
ways of Southeast Asia, like the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea 
together with the proximity of this region to China had granted it a strategic 
significance in the course of the Cold War global competitions. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, despite vanishing of the communist threat, 
Southeast Asia has maintained its significance for the United States due to 
at least two factors of China rise and war against terror (Dalpino 2008). The 
United States, in turn, has remained important for the countries of Southeast 
Asia as a counterbalance against the Chinese growing power (Egberink and 
Van Der Putten 2011: 29). Such security interconnectedness keeps 
Southeast Asia and the United States strategically significant for each other 
and therefore makes it justifiable for the countries of Southeast Asia to 
cooperate with the United States over matters of high security importance.  
Seeing the signs of Iranian success in attracting the Southeast Asian 
support for its nuclear program, the United States accelerated its pace to 
convince the countries of this region to abide by the sanctions regime 
against Iran; either those imposed unilaterally by the United States or those 
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that had the approval of the United Nations. In a step towards tightening the 
noose on Iran in Southeast Asia, in an interview with the Thailand national 
television in July 2009, the United States' Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, expressed her country's resolve in stopping Iranian nuclear program 
and invited the international community to cooperate with the United States 
to keep up pressure on Iran (Landler and Sanger 2009). In another occasion, 
in her visit to Cambodia in July 2012, Clinton once again invited the heads 
of the Southeast Asian countries to cooperate with the United States and 
apply pressure on Iran with the aim to halt the Iranian nuclear program. She 
also warned the Southeast Asian countries not to ease pressures on Iran: "If 
we ease the pressure or waver in our resolve, Iran will have less incentive to 
negotiate in good faith or to take the necessary steps to address the 
international community's concerns about its nuclear program" (The Nation 
2012).  
The United States pressures left their imprint on the way the countries 
of Southeast Asia responded to the Iranian demands for support. In some 
cases, these countries found themselves locked between hard choices; either 
to support Iran and antagonise the United States or to comply with the 
United States demands and lose the large benefits of economic cooperation 
with Iran. One occasion which demonstrates the awkward conditions the 
countries of Southeast Asia found themselves in was the Malaysian odd 
behaviour when confronted with the Iran dilemma. Short after Malaysia 
voted "no" to the proposed IAEA resolution against Iran, the Malaysian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled its envoy to the agency and dismissed 
him from his post. It was done after the United States expressed concern 
over the vote (Heinrich 2010). The United States pressures also put the 
Southeast Asian countries in reactive positions in some other cases. For 
instance, claims about Malaysia cooperation with Iran in acquiring dual use 
items obliged the Malaysia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kohilan 
Pillay, to dismiss allegations of Malaysia's assistance to the Iranian nuclear 
program (MySinchew 2009). The same happened to Indonesia when it 
found no choice but to vote "yes" to the United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1835 against Iran after it had abstained from supporting the 1803 
resolution some months earlier.  
Apart from diplomatic area, in the economic scene, intensification of 
sanctions tied the hands of the Southeast Asian countries to continue 
working with Iran. From this phase onwards, the trend of increase in 
interactions started to reverse. Due to difficulty in currency transmission as 
a result of Iran's detachment from the global Society for the Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, the import of 
commodities from Indonesia grew difficult for Iran. According to Reuters, 
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Iran's purchase of palm oil from Indonesia was disrupted in 2012 
(Koswanage 2012). As a result of sanctions, Malaysia reduced the import of 
oil from Iran together with some other customers. This reduction in 
purchase was a mechanism put in place by the United States in order for 
some importers of Iranian oil to be exempted from sanctions for a period of 
180 days (Cordesman et al. 2014: 40). To abide by the sanctions regime, 
Petronas of Malaysia stopped selling refined petroleum products to Iran. 
The company refrained from further cooperation with Iran in establishment 
of a natural gas company. The contract for this joint venture had been 
signed in 2004 (Koswanage and Pachymuthu 2010). Malaysia's AirAsia also 
suspended flights to Iran in the mist of sanctions in October 2012 (AirAsia 
2012).   
In fact, the Malaysian companies were taking cue from those entities 
that had been previously hit by United States sanctions. Before that, the 
Bureau of Industry and Security of the United States Department of 
Commerce had placed the Anvik Technologies under sanctions for alleged 
transfer of electronic devices to Iran (Bricketto 2010). Singapore's 
cooperation with Iran was also reduced considerably after the Mid Oil Asia 
and Singa Tankers were sanctioned by the United States because of 
cooperation with Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore 2013). In 
addition to the perils of United States sanctions, the Singapore commercial 
and economic entities were dissuaded from cooperating with Iran due to 
their own national restrictions. According to the Singapore financial 
regulations, breach of the United Nations Security Council's resolutions by 
the public or private entities of this country shall be prosecuted and 
offenders may face a fine of up to USD 1 million (Murugason 2013). The 
Filipino exporters were also in trouble to continue trade with Iran; mainly as 
a result of difficulties in receiving their export money. While before 
sanctions they used to receive their money in two weeks, after sanctions 
came into force, this time was doubled. The hardships in financial 
transactions with Philippine were heightened to a degree that Iran proposed 
paying its debts in oil instead of hard currency (FreshPlaza 2012). 
In addition to the United States, the Chinese factor has been in place 
to restrict Iran's cooperation with Southeast Asia. China has acted as a 
limiting factor in Iran-Southeast Asia relations in two ways: First the 
priority of China in Iran's Look to the East policy, and second, the 
competitive nature of China's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. 
With respect to China's priority in Iran's Look to the East policy, there is an 
entrenched attitude among Iranian policy-makers that China (along with 
Russia) is the best eastern option Iran can count on in its foreign relations. 
Motivated by economic benefits and differences with the United States in 
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the way they perceive Iranian nuclear program, the Chinese preserved their 
activities in Iranian oil industries longer than any other country. While 
almost all Iran's international partners retreated from cooperation with Iran 
by the end of 2011, due to a combination of United States pressures and the 
vague outlook of investment in Iran because of the increase in sanctions 
intensity, China continued its activities in Iranian oil industry and 
maintained its trade relations with Iran. Despite the United States and 
international sanctions, China cooperated with Iran in production of oil and 
gas and continued its gasoline export to Iran. The fact that Iran's western 
partners were drawing back from cooperation with Iran granted China an 
unprecedented opportunity to stabilise its place in Iranian market and win 
profitable contracts in oil extraction and petroleum production. Therefore, 
albeit quite cautiously and with a slower pace, China continued its presence 
in Iranian oil and gas industries much longer than any other Iranian partner 
(Down and Maloney 2011). 
Iran-China cooperation is not limited to trade and energy production 
and encompasses a variety of other spheres. The Chinese consumer products 
are well-spread in Iranian market. They range from electronics to car spare-
parts and toys. Iran also receives a part of its capital goods from China. 
Iran's cooperation with China has also strong political and diplomatic 
dimensions. China's support for Iran's right to use peaceful nuclear 
technology and defiance of western sanctions in the zenith of Iran's tensions 
with the United States granted Iran the opportunity to pursue its idea of 
independence from the West. Iran and China have also common visions 
about the grand issues in international politics. Iran praises the Chinese 
economic development and China sees Iran a centre of gravity in the Middle 
East and an ancient civilisation. Beijing and Tehran both maintain negative 
views about the United States hegemonic position. From a Chinese 
perspective Iran is the only country in the Middle East that can prevent an 
all-out American hegemony in this region (Down and Maloney 2011).  
In contrast to China, the countries of Southeast Asia have never been 
this much reliable for Iran when the issue of alliance building against the 
United Sates has been raised in Tehran. Southeast Asia has always looked at 
the United States as a global superpower that can contain the power and 
influence of China in its neighbourhood. Therefore, from a strategic 
perspective, Southeast Asians have few reasons to oppose the United States. 
This reality puts them in a more vulnerable position than China when 
resistance towards American pressures comes to the fore. This provides the 
basis for Iran to prioritise China over its Southeast Asian neighbours when 
establishing strategic partnerships is concerned.  
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Together with China's priority over Southeast Asia in Iran's strategic 
calculations, what further pushes this region to the margins of Iran's Look to 
the East policy is China's greater competition power in comparison with 
Southeast Asia. China-Southeast Asia relations has undergone many 
developments during the past two decades. The most important issue 
between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is Chinese military 
modernisation and increase in its activities in the South China Sea. Due to 
geographical proximity there are few international actors that are affected 
by China's rise like the Southeast Asian countries. A review of China-
Southeast Asia relations reveals that from 1997 onwards a combination of 
political and economic concerns have shaped their relations (Ba 2003: 634). 
The most important concerns are those of ASEAN's competition capabilities 
vis-à-vis China in terms of the products final market prices. Such concerns 
have been intensified after the financial crisis in Southeast Asia at the end of 
1990s and also China's accession to the World Trade Organization. All these 
make China and the countries of Southeast Asia rivals over access to 
markets and absorbing of foreign investments (Severino 2001). Despite all 
advantages of integration with China for Southeast Asia, the latter feels less 
capable to compete with China in reduction of the products market prices. 
With upgrading its efficiency China has managed to overcome the adverse 
impacts of the rise in labour wages and keep the production expenses low. 
However, the Southeast Asian producers have remained in production of 
labour-intensive products phase and are struggling to compete with China in 
upgrading their goods and producing commodities that have higher value-
added (Drysdale 2012). 
China-ASEAN competitions have been reflected in their interactions 
with Iran. At the height of Iran's Look to the East policy the amount and 
value of Iran's trade interactions with China was much more than that of 
Southeast Asian countries. While Iran's export to China was USD 
2,051,320,534 in 2008, the value of Iranian exports to the Major Southeast 
Asian countries did not exceed USD 913,269,369. In the same year, Iranian 
import from China was USD 4,495,354,615 which was much more than 
imports from Southeast Asia with a value of USD 1,944,302,420. Such a 
difference can be observed in all years that Iran pursued the policy of Look 
to the East. The gap between Iran's trade interactions with China in 
comparison with Southeast Asia deepens even further after Iran undergoes 
heavier sanction pressures in 2011 and 2012. This supports the discussion 
about Chinese more enduring resistance towards the United States pressures 
compared with the Southeast Asian countries. In 2011 the value of Iran's 
export to china became six times and its imports from China slightly less 
than four times more than Southeast Asian countries. In 2012, Iranian export 
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to China valued 20 times more than that of Southeast Asia and its imports 
from China seven times more than Southeast Asia.  
Even in the post-sanctions era and with the gradual removal of the 
legal and political constraints to expansion of ties between Iran and 
Southeast Asia after resolution of Iran's nuclear issue, a return to the pick of 
Iran-Southeast Asia cooperation is unlikely. Following the logic that Iran's 
relations with Southeast Asia is a dependent factor to Iran's relations with 
the great powers suggests that shifts in Iran-West relations from conflict to 
cooperation, though in modest degrees, does not bode well for a re-flourish 
of Iran's relations with Southeast Asia. The moderate government of 
Hassam Rouhani has a positive attitude towards cooperation with the 
western countries and pursues the same economic logic that characterised 
Rafsanjani and Khatami's foreign policies. This logic dictates détente with 
the West with the aim of attracting investments and gaining access to the 
most advanced technologies that are primarily western while maintaining 
positive and trade-based relations with the East with priority given to China 
and Russia. Therefore, the return of the heady days of Iran's cooperation 
with Southeast Asia is not on the horizon. Instead, Southeast Asia is 
expected to retain its traditional position in Iran's foreign relations as a 
region of medium importance that is best relevant to Iran's economic 
interests than being a political resort. 
      
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature on Iran's foreign policy has failed to address the issues 
pertaining to Iran-Southeast Asia relations to date. Despite this scholarly 
silence, Iran has experienced extensive relations with the countries of 
Southeast Asia. A review of the trend of relations reveals that from 2007 to 
2011, the commercial and economic relations between Iran and each of 
Southeast Asian countries increased dramatically. However, this rise was 
not sustained and collapsed to the previous levels after 2011. The sudden 
rise in trade is a result of adopting the policy of Look to the East by Iran. 
This policy was meant to solidify economic relations with the East with the 
aim to, first find alternatives to the western partners, and second to win the 
political and diplomatic support of the eastern countries in the course of 
intensifying confrontation with the West. The Look to the East policy, 
showed some signs of success at the beginning and two Southeast Asian 
countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, refrained from fully cooperating with the 
United States to pressure Iran over its nuclear program. However, this 
cooperative stance did not last long. The United States' diplomatic initiatives 
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and the legal restrictions drawn by the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, tied the hands of Southeast Asian countries to continue 
cooperating with Iran. 
Together with the United States, China has also had a limiting impact 
on the scope of Iran-Southeast Asia relations. China's role in restricting 
Iran's relations with ASEAN members is two-fold. First, China is prioritised 
over countries of Southeast Asia in Iran's policy of Look to the East. China's 
possession of larger resources in comparison with its Southeast Asian 
neighbours and the similarity in strategic viewpoints between Iran and 
China, particularly when it comes to the global status of the United States, 
makes China a more reliable partner for Iran than countries of Southeast 
Asia. In contrast to the members of ASEAN which are pursuing a balance of 
power policy between China and the United States in their neighbourhood, 
China has shown a more independent posture against the United States 
global agenda-setting. Second, is about China-Southeast Asia competitions 
and China's more competitive power in terms of producing more affordable 
goods. These two factors have driven Iran to choose China over Southeast 
Asia when it comes to establishing durable partnerships.  
Even resolution of Iran's nuclear issue does not coincide with actual 
restoration of expanded relations between Iran and Southeast Asia. The 
revival of the moderate and reform-inclined tide in the Iranian political 
spectrum with the presidency of Hassan Rouhani that maintains positive 
attitude towards cooperation with the West means that European partners 
gradually return to their position as the major providers of technology and 
sources of foreign investment for Iran. In this way, détente with the West 
puts Southeast Asia in its accustomed place in Iranian foreign relations as a 
region of medium significance and a second-tier trade partner rather than a 
political resort. 
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to teaching, he was a research fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies 
and continues to do research on Middle Eastern politics. 
1
  In this article the relations between Iran and the largest countries of Southeast Asia 
are studies. These countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and 
Philippines. 
2
  By "great powers" I refer to the greatest powers that impact the security-political 
equations of Southeast Asia. These include the United States and China. Since the 
stances and positions of the European powers are close to those of the United States 
with respect to Iran's nuclear program and containing Iran's influence in regions, the 
term "great powers" implies the European powers as well. The only great power that 
is intentionally put aside from analysis in the present research is Russia. The reason 
is that, compared with other great powers, Russian influence on the Southeast Asian 
dynamics is limited. Russia has also very limited impact on Iran's relations with the 
countries of Southeast Asia. 
3
  The data on Iran's trade with the Southeast Asian countries is taken from the website 
of the Iranian customs, accessible at: http://www.irica.gov.ir/Portal/Home/ 
Default.aspx?CategoryID=fd61187e-a080-4800-bb4b-0a3d0946cc10 
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